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Projet AlGorille
Rapport de recherche n
 
6037 — Novembre 2006 — 27 pages
Abstract: Fault tolerant protocols such as Total Order Broadcast are key aspects on
the development of reliable distributed systems, but they are barely supported on large-
scale systems due to the cost of traditional techniques. This paper revisits a class of Total
Order Broadcast protocols called moving sequencer, known by its communication efficiency.
Indeed, we evaluate RBP, one of the most known implementations of moving sequencer
protocols. We demonstrate how RBP can be used with wide-area systems, and we propose
new techiques to improve its resiliency and consistency properties under failures, as well as
improving its scalability aspects.
Key-words: Total Order Broadcast, Group Membership, View Synchronous Communi-
cation, Scalability
∗ IUT Nancy Charlemagne - Université Nancy 2
Modèle de Diffusion avec Ordre Total extensible et
efficace
Résumé : Des protocoles tolérants aux fautes comme la Diffusion avec Ordre Total (To-
tal Order Broadcast) sont des eléments-clés dans le développement de systèmes distribués
fiables. Malheureusement, ces protocoles sont très peu utilisés avec des systèmes de grande
taille à cause du coût des techniques traditionnelles. Ce travail revisite une classe d’algorithmes
pour la Diffusion avec Ordre Total appelée moving sequencer, connue par son efficacité. Nous
étudions notamment les caractéristiques du protocole RBP, en soulignant ses avantages et
faiblesses. Ainsi, nous proposons des techniques pour améliorer les aspects de résilience,
consistance et extensibilité de RBP, techniques qui peuvent être aussi utilisées par d’autres
algorithmes avec des caractéristiques similaires.
Mots-clés : Diffusion avec Ordre Total, Membership de Groupe, Communication avec
Vues Synchrones, Extensibilité
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1 Introduction
Total Order Broadcast, also known as Atomic Broadcast [14] is one of the essential building
blocks for a fault tolerant distributed system and therefore is the subject of a considerable
amount of literature, as observed by Defago [10]. In spite of the different implementation
strategies to assign a global sequence number to the messages, we observe that there are two
main implementation methods, namely the ”agreement-based” and the ”sequencer-based”
strategies. In the first method, a process is assigned with the special role of ”sequencer”, i.e.,
this process assigns the delivery order of the messages (the role of sequencer may be fixed
or may move among the processes). In the second method, instead of relying in a single
sequencer, the processes engage on a consensus operation [5] to ensure a global delivery
order.
When dealing with large-scale systems (such as computational grids or P2P networks),
the performance of an algorithm (and consequently the number of exchanged messages)
becomes a key aspect. Agreement-based algorithms usually do not scale well, therefore
we are invited to evaluate different implementations of the Total Order Broadcast, looking
for an algorithm that minimizes the number of coordination messages and the number of
communication steps required to deliver a message. Further, as large-scale systems are
specially prone to node volatility and network problems, we also need to minimize the cost
induced by a process failure.
In this paper we address the problem of efficient and scalable Total Order Broadcast
through the study of the Reliable Broadcast Protocol, also known as RBP. Proposed by
Chang and Maxemchuk [6] in 1984, RBP aims to provide total order and reliable broadcast
in a distributed system subjected to process failures and fair-lossy links. While the original
definitions are not recent, new protocols still rely on its concepts (for example, RMP [16],
Pinwheel [9] and TRMP [15]). Basically, RBP is structured around a token ring, used to
distribute responsibility for acknowledgements. A single token is passed from site to site
around the ring, and only the holder of the token (also called the sequencer) can acknowledge
the messages, and assign sequence numbers to them. The acknowledgement contains the
identifiers (source id, for example) of the sequenced message, and is broadcasted to all
members of the ring.
While RBP is quite efficient when there are no failures, it also should deal with process
failures. Hence, its definition considers a quite obsolete membership management that can-
not ensure most of the group communication properties. Therefore, we start our analysis by
comparing RBP Reformation Phase with another group membership technique, the View
Synchronous Communication - VSC [4, 13]. Indeed, we explore one variant from the VSC
model, called two views model [7], that is especially adapted to the needs of RBP, as it allow
us to take advantage from failure detectors with aggressive timeouts while minimizing the
drawbacks from incorrect suspicions. Based on this analysis, we propose a Group Member-
ship Service based on the VSC model that provides efficient and adapted group membership
in a wide-area network while respecting the properties of the VSC model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the system defini-
tions and models considered in this work, as well as the properties a Total Order Broadcast
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must ensure. Section 3 describes the RBP protocol operational model first in a failure-free
environment, and then in a the presence of process failures. In Section 4 we revisit the RBP
algorithm, in the light of new techniques. Indeed, we could identify many similarities be-
tween RBP and the Primary-Backup replication model, which present many solutions that
can be applied to improve RBP. In Section 5 we present an improved solution for RBP Ref-
ormation Phase, based in the VSC Group Membership Service. Finally, Section 6 reviews
some works related to RBP, and Section 7 presents the conclusions of this work.
2 System Model and Definitions
Distributed systems are modeled as a set of processes Π = {p1; p2; ...; pn} that interact by
exchanging messages through communication channels. As the set of processes is dynamic,
i.e, a process that fails can join or be removed from the set, a better representation for
the set of processes is π(t), that means, the set of processes can vary over time. A process
that does not crash during all the execution is called correct. However, as we assume an
asynchronous system, even a correct process can be suspected of crashing. To differentiate a
wrongly suspected process from a crashed process is a problem in asynchronous distributed
systems, and thus, the protocols should consider this possibility.
We also consider Fair-lossy channels [1], that ensures only that if p sends a message m to
q an infinite number of times and q is correct, then q receives m from p an infinite number
of times. If we have fair-lossy channels, we can construct reliable communication primitives
SEND(m) and RECEIVE( ) using unreliable send(m) and receive( ), by ensuring that
the message m is retransmitted until its successful reception (the receiver can send an ack,
for example).
2.1 Total Order Broadcast Specification
The problem of Total Order Broadcast problem can be defined by four properties, namely
Validity, Agreement, Integrity, and Total Order [10]. However, we should remark that the
Agreement, Integrity and Total Order properties may be Uniform or Non-Uniform. A
Uniform property applies not only to correct processes but also to faulty processes. While
the basic definition of RBP supposes Uniform deliver, i.e., a process can only deliver messages
after all process have received it, we can suppose possible scenarios where this requirement
can be weakened. In Section 3.3 we discuss what is the lowest level of Non-Uniform deliver
that the protocol can use without violating the consistency of the application. Due to this
possibility, the Non-Uniform properties are presented below and considered all through the
document:
VALIDITY - If a correct process broadcasts a message m to Dest(m), then some correct
process in Dest(m) eventually delivers m.
AGREEMENT - If a correct process delivers a message m, then all correct processes
in Dest(m) eventually deliver m.
INRIA
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INTEGRITY - For any message m, every correct process p delivers m at most once,
and only if (1) m was previously broadcast by sender(m), and (2) p is a process in Dest(m).
TOTAL ORDER - If correct processes p and q both deliver messages m and m’, then
p delivers m before m’ if and only if q delivers m before m’.
To reliably transmit messages over unreliable channels (as in the case of fair-lossy chan-
nels) RBP uses explicit retransmission requests. Message losses are detected by finding dis-
crepancies between the expected messages and the received ones. Total ordering is achieved
in RBP by assigning an unique sequence number to each message sent to the group, and
delivering messages in this order. Most of the complexity of the protocol resides in provid-
ing these sequence numbers, ensuring that for each sequence number corresponds a single
message.
3 Total Order and the Moving Sequencer Strategy
In distributed algorithms, Total Order Broadcast is usually provided by defining a global
agreed sequence of messages (for example, by assigning sequence numbers to the messages),
and then delivering them to the application following that order. If we use sequence numbers,
this implies that no two messages receive the same sequence number, and by this reason, the
sequence number must be globally unique. A simple solution to provide Total Order would
be to centralize the distribution of sequence numbers in a fixed process (the sequencer).
This approach, however, has many drawbacks, especially when the environment is subject
to process failures (it introduces a single point of failure).
To ensure the liveness of the algorithm, the protocol must use some fault tolerant mech-
anism. In the moving sequencer strategy, as defined by [10], a single process assigns the
sequence number to the messages. However, the role of sequencer is not fixed, but moves
among the processes. Hence, this algorithm can be implemented using a token-passing strat-
egy: the process that holds the token is the only one that can assign sequence numbers to
the messages (the sequencer is sometimes called token site or token holder). If there are
no failures, the token passing strategy is enough to provide Total Order, as once sequence
numbers are assigned all receivers eventually obtain them (the token holder must obtain all
previous sequenced messages before assigning a new sequence number).
To simplify the description of the protocol we can make strong assumptions such as
requiring that each token site assigns a sequence number to a single message, and then must
pass the token to the next process. Therefore, each sequencing round of the protocol can
be described in three steps, as presented by Fig 1: first, someone (a sender) broadcasts a
message m to all processes; the token holder picks this message, assigns a sequence number
to it, and broadcasts the message ID and the sequence number to all processes; finally, the
token is passed to the next process in the ring.
This scheme ensures that the sequence number assigned to each message is globally
unique because the last sequence number assigned is transmitted with the token, and only
RR n
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Figure 1: Process p sends message m to all
the process that has the token can assign a new number. If messages are delivered according
to this order, Total Order is ensured.
Of course, this is not enough if the channels are not reliable. It can happen, for example,
that some processes do not receive the message m from the sender. In this case, the solution
is to request retransmissions. Fig. 2 illustrates an example of such a situation. At time t=0,
process s did not receive the message m. Later, it receives a message containing the message
ID and a sequence number assigned to that message. As message m was not received, process
s cannot deliver it, and thus, must request a retransmission, which is done at time t=2.
Figure 2: Process s requests retransmission concurrently to the token passing
Another situation that requires message retransmission is when the sequence number
is not received (Fig. 3). When a process s receives a message that assigns a sequence
number=2 to the message m’ (at time t=3 ). As s did not receive before a message assigning
the number 1, at time t=4 it requests the retransmission of all sequence messages between
1 (the number it was expecting) and 2 (the last number it received). Only when someone
answer to its requests, with a copy of the lost message ({id(m), 1}), s can go ahead with
message processing (and for example, accept the token).
While this strategy provides total order and reliable broadcast, it still can be improved
in relation to the number of messages exchanged. On example can be observed in the
algorithm: the sequencer sends two different messages, the sequence number and the token.
A simple solution for these problems can be found by piggybacking extra information on
the sequence message, reducing the number of exchanged messages. Indeed, the messages
broadcasted by the sequencer may aggregate four separate functions as defined by RBP[6]:
  acknowledgement to source s that message m has been received by the ring members;
INRIA
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Figure 3: Process s requests retransmission
  inform all receivers that message m is assigned to the global sequence number seqnum;
  acknowledgement to the previous sequencer (acceptation of the token);
  transmission of the token to the next sequencer.
Aggregating such functions in a single message (the token), a step of communication is
reduced to only two messages. There, the message sent by the sequencer has the following
roles: it sends an ack to sender s, it indicates to all the sequence number assigned to m, it
sends an ack to the previous sequencer p, and it sends the token to r.
A problem that occurs when we overload all functions in a single message is that if this
message is lost, many events dependent on its reception are triggered. A good example,
which must be handled by the protocol, is the phenomenon of old messages. Old messages
are in fact messages that have already been acknowledged, but continue to arrive. This
can occur when a source or a sequencer did not receive the acks it was waiting (due to
communication failures, for example), and thus, keeps sending a message (cf. Fig. 4).
If a source retransmits a message that has already been acknowledged, we can suppose
that the source failed to receive the acknowledgement (and by definition, will continue to
retransmit the message until receiving the ack). In this case, the current token holder must
retransmit the acknowledgement to that source despite the original token holder. Another
situation where old messages can occur is when a former sequencer keeps sending the token.
If it keeps sending the token, we can suppose that the process failed to receive the token-
passing acknowledgement. When this situation happens, the acknowledgements must be
retransmitted by the current sequencer.
Figure 4: Ack retransmission when the source lost the message
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3.1 Number of Messages
Due to the ability to piggyback acknowledgements and token passing in a single message,
RBP uses very efficiently the network resources. Indeed, if no message is lost, RBP needs
only two broadcasts: the first one, sent by the message source, submits the message; the
second one comes from the sequencer, which assigns a sequence number to that message at
the same time that passes the token to the next sequencer. Thus, if no messages are lost,
the protocol requires only 2 × (n − 1) messages (assuming that broadcasts transmit n − 1
point-to-point messages) for each message to be delivered.
Comparatively, the Atomic Broadcast based on the Consensus [5] may exchanges up to
(4+2n)× (n− 1) messages in a single execution step. There are other consensus algorithms
that try to minimize the number of messages, as for example the Early Consensus [18], but
their main focus is on the reduction of communication steps, which leads to a the number
of exchanged messages still high (generating O(n2) messages against O(n) from RBP).
3.2 Operation in Case of Failures
As presented in the previous section, the mechanism of the moving sequencer strategy is
intrinsically connected to the token passing mechanism. As the token is passed in a logical
ring, a single failure can block the protocol. To ensure liveness and restart the token passing,
the token list must be reconstructed by removing suspected processes [6]. As the possession
of the token gives an special role to a process, the impact of a failure is directly connected
to the role of the failed process. To make this scenario even more complex, message losses
can lead to inconsistent states, and thus, the set of messages received or sent by the failed
process is also an important parameter to determine the impact of the problems caused by
the failure.
An important aspect to be considered is how failures are detected. Current protocols
usually employ Chandra and Toueg failure detectors as full-time services, a way to improve
accuracy of the suspicion mechanism. Old protocols such as RBP, however, rely on simpler
strategies to detect the failure of a process, and indeed, the RBP definition defines a suspicion
of a process unsuccessfully tries to contact another process a certain number of times. This
makes the failure detection very specific: as the roles executed by the processes differ in
importance (a sequencer worth more than a sender), RBP establishes an ad-hoc failure
detection.
In RBP, when a failure is detected, the failed process must be removed from the token list.
Indeed, when a failure is detected the correct processes shall enter in a different execution
mode, called Reformation Phase, which aims to create a new token list. Once a new token
list is accepted by a majority of correct processes, a new sequencer must be defined to restart
the sequencing. Note that the reformation phase is blocking, as none of the failure situations
exposed in the previous section allow the processing to continue.
In a failure situation, each process that detects the failure (called originator) invokes
the reformation phase and proposes a new token list. This new token list carries a version
INRIA
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number. As new failures and communication losses can occur, the own reformation phase
must be tolerant to these failures.
In RBP, Reformation is a three-phase commit (3PC) protocol coordinated by the origi-
nator [15]. Fig. 5 presents a good run of the RBP Reformation Phase. It starts when the
originator contacts each process in the new token list (the slaves), and ask them to join
this list (Phase 1). If the list is accepted by all members that compose it (Phase 2), the
originator chooses a process to be the new sequencer. This selection aims to choose the
process with the greatest knowledge from the previous list, i.e., the process with the most
recent committed message. Before restarting the message sequencing, the new sequencer
must update the other processes, by retransmitting the lost messages. This last step is
really important because when the reformation finishes, we assume that all processes have
the same knowledge about the others.
Figure 5: Reformation phase in a good run
However, this Reformation protocol has some drawbacks. As the detection is not simulta-
neous to all processes, multiple processes can invoke the reformation concurrently (multiple
originators). To ensure that only a valid token list emerges from the reformation phase,
RBP defines some constraints for the new token list and the processes:
  A site can join only one list each time;
  There must be only one valid token list;
  It must be composed by the majority of processes;
  It must be the most recent list proposed (having the higher version number);
  No message committed by the old token list can be lost.
These constraints can be grouped in three tests, as listed below [6]:
Majority test: The list must have a majority of the processes.
Sequence test: A site can only join a list with a version number greatest than its
previous list
Resiliency test: No message committed by the old token list is lost. At least one site
must have all committed (stable) messages.
RR n
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Thus, a list must pass by all these tests before being accepted. One important point
to remark is that a process excluded from the token list is allowed to join it in a future
reformation (and [6] do not specify how these processes proceed to recover messages in
order to keep the application consistent).
As some processes can be excluded from the token list (due to a false suspicion, for
example), the protocol must ensure that messages sent by excluded processes do not interfere
with the processing. Thus, each message is tagged by the token list version, which allows a
process in the normal phase to discard messages coming from excluded processes.
3.3 Resiliency, Message Stability and Garbage Collection
Up to now, nothing was said about resiliency. However, as processes may crash (and the
network may lose messages), it is important to specify the resiliency level that the protocol
provides (or requires). Resiliency is intrinsically tied to message delivery. If we want to
tolerate process failure, we cannot deliver messages immediately as they are received: if only
one process receives a message, delivers it and crash, it can happen that other processes do
not follow the same delivery order, which can lead to inconsistencies in the application.
Usually, we express resiliency levels by k-resiliency. This means that if we want to
tolerate k-1 failures, we should ensure that the message was received by at least k processes.
The most restrictive level that can be achieved in a system is the total resiliency, where all
processes must receive the message before delivering it to the application layer. This way,
using total resiliency we ensure the Uniform property.
In RBP, total resiliency is easy to be implemented. We just need to wait until the token be
transmitted to all processes before delivering the message(s) (as each process that receives
the token must acquire all previous messages). In our assumptions, each new sequence
number broadcast means a new token passing. As result, when the sequence number k is
sent by sequencer r, this implies:
  receiver r has all messages up to and including the k th sequenced message,
  receiver (r -1) mod n (we use modulo operation because the processes are in a logical
ring) has all messages up to and including the (k -1)th sequenced message,
  ...
  receiver (r -n+1) mod n has all messages up to and including the (k -n+1)th sequenced
message.
When a message was received by all processes, it can be considered stable. If we consider
the relations above, when process p sends a sequence number k, all messages with sequence
number less or equal than k-n+1 can be delivered, because all processes have them. However,
even if the application requires lower levels of resiliency, detecting message stability is an
important issue.
The reason why message stability is so important comes from the following observation:
if all processes have a message m, then m will not be requested anymore for a retransmission.
INRIA
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If we can detect message stability, we can execute garbage collection safely, saving storage
space. Due to its ring characteristic, RBP is especially apt to detect message stability, and
thus, can execute a very efficient garbage collection.
In RMP [16], however, the application can define the level of resiliency it wants (in [17]
this is considered a QoS level), and thus, RMP can provide n-resiliency, majority resiliency,
and even unreliable deliver. As in distributed systems subjected to process failures the
consistency of the application is a fundamental concern, we should analyze what is the
lowest level of resiliency that RBP can provide without violating consistency.
First, suppose that p assigns a sequence number to a message m, broadcasts it and
crashes (real failure). Suppose also that once a process receives a message, it can deliver it
immediately. Due to network links and the failure, it is possible that only a set of processes
have received the message from p. If at least one process receives the sequenced message, it
will deliver the message, and once the Reformation Phase is called, this process will share
the message with the other processes, propagating the sequence number of m.
Now, suppose the same scenario but p does not really crashes. Due to a network partition,
p is not able to send messages to the other processes. Now, if p is the only process to have
received the message, it will be the only process to deliver it. When the other processes
detect its failure, the reformation shall generate a new token list without the message
sequenced by p, and thus, that sequence number will be assigned to other message. As p is
not really crashed, this scenario leads the system to an inconsistent state.
Through this example, we show that there is a lower bound on the RBP resiliency. We
cannot deliver messages immediately without risking an inconsistent state. In fact, if the
protocol is tolerant to f failures, it must wait f +1 token passings before delivering, to be
sure that at least one correct process has all messages. Unreliable deliver such as provided
by RMP can only be executed if the application does not require consistency among the
processes.
4 Revisiting the RBP Protocol
In the previous section, we presented the RBP protocol trying to follow the original specifi-
cation (actually, we just tried to present it step by step, in order to make easier the compre-
hension of its objectives and structures). We also presented some interesting characteristics
from the variants of RBP listed above.
While we presented some remarks that could improve the protocol (or at least, update it
with more recent techniques), no extra details were provided. In this section we will present
our suggestions to improve the protocol, based in the evaluations we have done so far and
in the techniques used nowadays to solve similar problems.
4.1 A Note in Failure Detection
Failure detection has evolved considerably since RBP was proposed, and the model of failure
detection specified by Chandra and Toueg is essential to most distributed applications today.
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Examining again the failure scenarios supported by RBP, it is possible to define two models
of detection: detection on a process failure (process deterministically identified) and absence
of activity from the sequencers.
The first model, similar to traditional failure detection, relies simply on monitoring
another process. Due to this characteristic, it is easy to detach the detection from the
RBP algorithm and use some other technique than the number of retransmissions. Indeed,
when this kind of detection is required, monitoring is done on the next or on the previous
process in the ring. If we consider that some detection techniques (like the Push and Pull
detectors) have some scalability problems, this specificity on the monitoring can help to
minimize the traffic on the network. In fact, this specific monitoring is similar to the ad-hoc
failure detectors, proposed to solve the Consensus problem.
In the second model of detection, however, there is no specific monitoring on some
process; the suspicion of a failure means that the protocol is not acting as usual. This
detection is especially important when the token is lost, because it prevents the protocol
from blocking forever (preserving the liveness property). A possible implementation of the
model presented by Chang and Maxemchuk [6] is monitoring the token passing (the protocol
specifies that there is a maximum time that a sequencer can hold the token before passing
it). However, as this maximum time is a parameter related to the implementation of the
RBP, this kind of detection cannot be easily detached from the protocol, as the suspicion
must be tuned with the same parameters as the token passing. A good aspect, however, is
that this model of detection does not generate any extra message.
It is clear that both detection techniques have different purposes. While the the first
method leads to a fast detection of failed processes, the second method aims at preserving
the liveness of the protocol, even if it does not provide aggressive detection. As token lost
situations tend to be rare in comparison with the other failure situations, the second model
of detection can be tuned with conservative timeouts. An active detection is good enough
for most situations, and only when the token is lost the passive detection should raise a
suspicion.
According to these remarks, we can replace the failure detection within the RBP by two
Chandra and Toueg-like detectors, each one operating under different requirements:
Active Detector: a failure detector with aggressive timeouts that monitors a specific
process.
Passive Detector: a failure detector with conservative timeouts (ideally, a detector
that only uses application messages in the detection), which starts the Reformation Phase
no matter the suspected process.
4.2 Weaknesses of the Reformation Phase
As presented in Section 3.2, the reformation phase proposed in [6] is a three-phase commit
protocol. If in a good run the reformation can be solved as in Fig. 5, this is not necessarily
the most usual situation, and the reformation can take much more time.
Let us consider the problem of defining a new token list. As each process that detects the
failure can start the reformation phase (the “multiple originators” from [6]), the definition
INRIA
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of a new token list is delayed until some list obtains majority of processes. However, this is
not so simple, because if the majority test takes too much time, any process is allowed to
leave that list and join/start another list. Together, these events can force new rounds of the
reformation phase, and when finally a new token list is agreed, all processes must acquire the
messages (and the message numbers) committed in the previous token list before returning
to the normal phase.
Another important point is that RBP definition of the reformation phase [6] supposes
that if some correct process does not belong to a valid token list, it can call another refor-
mation until it returns to the token list. The problem with this assumption is that while the
process is not in the valid token list, garbage collection is running. Once a new token list is
defined, messages become stable, and by definition we can consider that if garbage collection
is being done, the buffers from the processes will have at most the messages sequenced in
the last turn of the token, which is a too short interval, just enough to prevent an excluded
process to comes back and acquire all previous messages.
In summary, the reformation phase is the most critical part from the RBP protocol:
its definition is very old, and it lacks precision. In the next sections, we identify similari-
ties between RBP and Primary-Backup+VSC replication model. These similarities can be
exploited to improve the RBP protocol.
4.3 Similarities and Differences between Primary-Backup and RBP
In order to provide data replication, a technique usually present in the literature [4, 14, 7] is
the use of Primary-backup replication together with the View Synchronous Communication
(VSC). While Primary-backup provides total ordering conducted by the primary process (a
fixed sequencer approach), View Synchronous Communication deals with the membership
changes in a dynamic group (as the RBP Reformation Phase). Therefore, Primary-backup
replication and the RBP protocol present many similarities that can be exploited in our
work. First, they need to provide Total Order. Second, both techniques need dynamic
groups, as failures can block the progress of the protocol.
To solve the first problem, both techniques are based in the sequencer approach, i.e., they
ensure that only a single process can order the messages, and that this order is respected
by all processes. However, they differ in the way a sequencer is chosen. For the Primary-
Backup, a new sequencer (the primary) is only chosen when the precedent one has failed.
In RBP, the role of sequencer moves among the processes, even if there is no failure.
Also for the second problem, the need for dynamic groups, these techniques have similar
approaches. Both consider that when there is a failure, the role of the failed process is
important to define the need for a view change. While in Primary-Backup this view change
can be delayed indefinitely if the failed process is a backup, RBP eventually requires the
view change, as failures block the token passing.
Because this is a widely studied technique, the Primary Backup+VSC presents interest-
ing solutions that can be used to improve the RBP protocol. A short definition of these
techniques is provided below, and in Section 5 we suggest some innovations for the RBP
protocol, using the solutions presented here.
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4.4 Primary-Backup Replication
The primary-backup replication technique consists in having one primary server and one or
more backup servers (Fig. 6). If the primary fails, one of the backup servers is chosen to take
the role of primary. By definition, client requests are sent to the primary. When the primary
receives a request from a client, it performs the corresponding operation. Once the primary
has processed the request, it makes sure that each backup server is up-to-date with respect
to the new state. For that, the primary sends to the backup server an update message,
representing the state change induced by the processing of the request. After broadcasting
the update message, the primary waits for an acknowledgement from all backups. Once
acknowledgements have been received, the primary returns the reply to the client, and then
it is ready to handle the next request.
If there is no failure, it is clear that ordering is provided as all requests from the client
are processed by the primary, and the update messages replicate this order in the backups.
Atomicity is also ensured because the update is forwarded to all the backups and ack is
awaited by the primary before sending the response.
However, if there are failures, some situations make difficult to ensure Atomicity without
the use of additional techniques [19]. Specifically, a hard problem to solve occurs if the
primary fails while sending the update and before sending the reply. Besides this problem
of Atomicity, a new primary must be selected as the primary fails.
Figure 6: Primary-backup replication
4.5 Group Membership and View Synchronous Communication
View Synchronous Communication (VSC, for short) [3, 12] is an extension of the Group
Membership specification. It assumes an asynchronous system model where processes may
fail by crashing and may recover (joining the system under a new identity). VSC manages
the creation and maintenance of a set of processes (called group) in a dynamic system
model, i.e., processes can join and leave the system during the computation. The successive
memberships of a group are called views, and the event by which a new view is provided to
a process is called the install event. A process may leave the group, as result of an explicit
INRIA
Fast and Scalable Total Order Broadcast 15
request, because it failed or because it was excluded by other members of the current view.
In the same way, a process can join the group.
Considering a primary-partition group membership, we can define an agreement property
on the view history: if p installs vpi and if q installs v
q
i , then v
p
i = v
q
i . In VSC, broadcasts to
members of the current view are delivered with some guarantees. Therefore, VSCast denotes
the primitive by which a message is broadcasted by a process in view v, and VSDeliver
represents the primitive that delivers a message to a process in view v. The properties of
the VSC can be considered as [7]:
Validity : If a correct process executes VSCast(m), then it eventually VS-Delivers m
(in view v or in a subsequent view).
Termination : If a process executes VSCast(m), then (1) every process in view v
VS-Deliver(m) or (2) every correct process in v installs a new view.
View Synchrony : If a process p belongs to two consecutive views v and v′, and VS-
Deliver(m) in view v, then every process q in v ∩ v′ that installs v′, also VS-Delivers(m),
i.e., delivers m before installing v′.
Sending View Delivery : A message broadcasted in view v, if delivered, ought to be
delivered in view v.
Integrity : For any message m, every correct process VS-Delivers m at most once, and
only if m was previously VSCast.
According to [8], some protocols allow a weaker version of the Sending View Delivery
property. This weaker property, called Same View Delivery assumes that all processes
deliver a message m in the same view, even if this is not the view where the message was
initially sent.
The use of VSC in the primary-backup replication ensures the Atomicity requirements
even if there are failures, and allows the processes to select the primary server in a deter-
ministic way (as the view is agreed by all processes).
Assuming that a message stability detector (i.e., a process that verifies if all processes in
a view have received m) running concurrently, we can implement VSC as presented by [19]
(Algorithm 1):
Algorithm 1 Solving VSC view change [19]
VSCast(m) executed by pk:
send (i,m) to all in vi(g)
Upon reception of (i,m) by pk while in view vi(g):
VS-Deliver m add m to the set unstablek
Upon suspicion of some process in vi(g):
R-Broadcast(view-change, i)
Upon R-Deliver (view-change,i) by pk for the first time
1. send unstablek to all
2. ∀pi ∈ vi(g): wait until receive unstablei from pi or pi suspected
3. let initk be the pair (V iewk , Msgk) s.t.
- V iewk is the set (pi∪ the processes from which unstablei was received)
- Msgk is the union of the sets unstablei received
4. execute consensus among vi(g) with initk as the initial value
5. let (View, Msg) be the decision of consensus
6. VS-deliver all messages in Msg not yet VS-Delivered
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4.6 The time-bounded buffering problem
Reliable Broadcast, as used in the VSC algorithm presented above (including in the consen-
sus) are easy to implement in asynchronous systems with reliable channels: when a process
p wishes to R-Broadcast a message m, p sends m to all process. When some process q
receives m for the first time, q sends m to all processes and then R-Delivers m. However,
this implementation does not work with fair-lossy channels. A possible solution consists on
repeatedly execute send(m) until receiving an acknowledgement of m from each process.
Once a process p receives ack(m) from all processes in Dest(m), it can delete m from its
output buffer. This strategy, however, has a problem. If q crashes, p might never receive
ack(m) from q, then it must keep m in its output buffer forever.
This problem leads to the following question: is there an implementation of SEND and
RECEIVE in which p can safely delete m from its output buffer after a finite amount of
time? This problem was formalized by [7] as the time-bounded buffering problem. A time-
bounded buffering implementation of reliable communication is an implementation where
every message is eventually discarded from all output buffers.
It is easy to see that time-bounded buffering is related to message stability. If process
p knows that all processes in Dest(m) have either received m or crashed, then the message
m become stable and p can remove it safely. However, Charron-Bost et al. claim that
no implementation of Reliable Broadcast over fair-lossy links can solve the time-bounded
buffering problem, based solely on failure detectors of either class S or class P .
4.7 Program-Controlled Crash and View Changes
The impossibility of solving the time-bounded buffering problem with a S or P failure detec-
tor is a quite limiting constraint for practical systems. Systems based on View Synchronous
Communication usually overcome this impossibility by relying on program-controlled crash.
Program-controlled crash gives the ability to kill other processes or to commit suicide.
Program-controlled crash can be used in order to have a View Synchronous Communi-
cation implementation that ensures time-bounded buffering. Consider the following imple-
mentation: if after some time process p has not received ack from q, p can decide to kill q,
and then to discard m from its output buffer. Indeed, as q eventually crashes, there is no
obligation for q to R-Deliver m, and thus, p can safely discard m.
In fact, program-controlled crash is also used to ensure the view change properties. By the
Sending View Delivery property, if a message is broadcasted in view v, all correct processes
should deliver the messages broadcasted in the same view v. If a process is suspected, we
are not sure that it is crashed. In addition, the Termination property says that if there is a
view change, all correct processes eventually install view v′. Thus, by relying on program-
controlled crash, processes excluded from the next view are forced to crash, ensuring VSC
properties. For example, a simple way to force an excluded process to crash is to verify the
new view. If the process does not belong to the new view, it commits suicide.
Of course, the use of program-controlled crash has a non negligible cost. Every time a
process q is forced to crash, a membership change is required to exclude q. If in addition we
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should keep the same degree of replication, another process q’ must replace q, this brings
the extra cost of the state transfer to q’. Summing up, while program controlled crash is
necessary to solve the time-bounded buffering problem, incorrect suspicions must be avoided
as much as possible, to reduce the overhead caused by program-controlled crash. In order to
reduce the occurrence of incorrect suspicions, a common solution is to choose a conservative
timeout value for the implementation of the failure detectors. Unfortunately, the price of
this choice is a high fail over time, which can lead to blocking situations.
4.8 A two-level view model
In typical group membership architecture, solving efficiently the time-bounded buffering
problem and blocking prevention problem at the same time is not possible, because they
are linked to the same failure suspicion scheme. In order to explore better both issues,
Charron-Bost et al. proposes the use of two levels of GMS.
Therefore, each level of GMS defines different types of views. Ordinary views (or simply
views) are identical to the views of View Synchronous Communication. Intermediate views
(or i-views) are installed between ordinary views.
If ordinary views are denoted by v0, v1, . . . , vi, . . . , the i-views between vi and vi+1 are
denoted as v0i , v
1
i , . . . , v
j
i , . . . , v
last
i . The intermediate view v
0
i is equal to vi, and the last
intermediate view vlasti is equal to vi+1. One important point is that the membership of all
intermediate views v0i , v
1
i , . . . , v
last−1
i is the same as the membership of vi, that is, they only
differ in the order that processes are listed in the view. For example, vi = v
0
i = {p, q, r},
v1i = {q, r, p}, etc. During the existence of the i-views v
0
i , . . . , v
last−1
i the ordinary view
remains vi.
This model in two layers allows us to solve the problem from Section 4.7. Ordinary views
are generated by suspicions resulting from conservative timeouts, while i-views are generated
by suspicions resulting from aggressive timeouts. As all i-views from v0i , . . . , v
last−1
i are
composed by the same set of processes, they do not force the crash of processes. This way,
i-views contribute to avoid blocking situations, while ordinary views ensure time-bounded
buffering of messages.
The only issue that must be determined is how i-views are elaborated. An example
suggested by [7] (among various options) is a rotating coordinator i-view. In this example,
the first process in some i-view is considered the coordinator (for example, the primary
server in the primary-backup replication). When this coordinator is suspected, an i-view
change moves it to the end of the processes list, and a new process is automatically selected
as the coordinator.
5 A Group Membership Service adapted to Wide-Area
Networks
When we compare the view change technique, however, we observe that the Reformation
algorithm presents many drawbacks in comparison with the VSC model. First, the Ref-
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ormation algorithm is not a “full” membership layer, as it does not keep mediating the
communication between the processes. Instead, once a new token list is obtained from the
Reformation algorithm, is the RBP protocol that should manage the membership.
Second, the RBP Reformation seems to not provide the Same View Delivery property,
which all VSC primitives present. Suppose that a process is excluded from the token list,
i.e., it is not more present in the token list n. Once excluded from the token list, it does not
receive new messages from the ring, and thus, cannot detect the stability of the most recent
messages. Due to the k-resiliency requirements, this process cannot deliver these remaining
messages, as they seem unstable to it. If later this process rejoins the token list n+1, it
can realize that those messages are already stable, and deliver them in view n+1, while the
other processes have delivered in view n.
Therefore, the absence of the Same View Delivery property and the use of an efficient
(but aggressive) garbage collection generate a contradiction. If a process is allowed to re-
turn in a later view, and deliver messages in this view, we suppose that it could recover
lost messages (for example, the messages sequenced while this process was outside). As the
garbage collection is too aggressive, likely this process will be unable to acquire the miss-
ing messages, remaining inconsistent with the other processes. As RBP does not consider
program-controlled crash, this process cannot be killed to recover the consistency of the
application.
The lack of these properties reduces considerably the power from the RBP Reformation
Phase. Hopefully, we can replace the Reformation Phase algorithm. As the membership
problem is similar to both Primary-Backup and RBP, we can use the VSC view change in
order to upgrade the RBP Reformation algorithm.
The VSC view change presents many advantages in relation to the RBP Reformation.
First, the VSC view change is a distributed algorithm without a central coordinator. Once
a view change is called (through the broadcast of a view change message), all processes
are invited to start the view change. If many processes detect the failure simultaneously,
they will send the same view change message (as they belong to the same view), and thus,
they will take part on the same agreement. The consensus itself has no need to be fully
distributed (it can use rotating coordinators), because all processes agreed to start it. Based
on the view change from Algorithm 1, we can define a new algorithm adapted to the RBP
protocol (Algorithm 2).
Here, the “unstable” queue is the sequenced queue seqQ. Just remembering the RBP
protocol, a sequenced message remains in the sequenced queue until it is able to be delivered.
As we suppose uniform delivery, this means that messages in the sequenced queue are not yet
stable. Once a process receives the sequenced queue from all process that are not suspected,
it can computeMsgsk, that is the union of all received seqQ. It also can suggest a new token
list, based in the set of processes that answered it reformation message.
As the decision of the consensus comprise both the new token list and the set of all
unstable messages, all processes that get this decision have the same knowledge on the
unstable set. As this “uniform” knowledge can be considered as message stability, these
messages are ready to be delivered. As all processes share the same sequenced queue, any
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Algorithm 2 First sketch of the “View Change” reformation protocol
Upon suspicion of some process in TLi
RBroadcast (reformation, i)
Upon R-Deliver (reformation, i) by pk for the first time
1. send seqQk to all /* sends the ”unstable” list of messages */
2. ∀pi, wait until receive seqQi from pi or pi suspected
3. let initialk be the tuple (TLk, Msgsk) s.t.
- TLk is the new token list with all processes that sent their seqQ
- Msgsk is the union of the seqQ sets received
4. execute consensus among TLi processes, with initialk as the initial value
5. let (TL, Msg) be the consensus decision
6. stableQ ← Msg, seqQ ← {} /* as all processes get Msg, these messages are stable */
7. if pk ∈ TL, then ”install” TL as the next view TLi+1
process can be the new sequencer, and we can select, for example, the first process in the
token list.
5.1 RBP Reformation and Process-Controlled Crash
According to the examples presented in the previous section, the original RBP Reformation
algorithm does provide neither Same View Delivery nor Sending View Delivery properties.
Associated with an aggressive garbage collection, the absence of these properties can lead
the protocol to a contradictory situation: the protocol allows a removed process to come
back to the token list, but does not ensure that it will be able to acquire all the missing
messages. If such situation occurs, a cyclic situation can happen: the inconsistent process
blocks the token passing, it is removed from the token list, it tries to come back... In fact,
the solution to avoid this problem is to force an excluded process to suicide, which is not
considered by [6].
By modifying “View Change Reformation” presented in Algorithm 2, we solve this prob-
lem. As presented in Section 4.7, we can implement program-controlled crash by checking
the new view. If a process is excluded from the new view (i.e., the new token list), it is
forced to commit suicide, solving the time-bounded buffering problem and ensuring the VSC
properties. This modification can be easily made, as presented in Algorithm 3. Here, if a
process was excluded from the new view (line 7), it commits suicide.
Algorithm 3 “View Change” reformation protocol with program-controlled crash
Upon suspicion of some process in TLi
RBroadcast (reformation, i)
Upon R-Deliver (reformation, i) by pk for the first time
1. send seqQk to all /* sends the ”unstable” list of messages */
2. ∀pi, wait until receive seqQi from pi or pi suspected
3. let initialk be the tuple (TLk, Msgsk) s.t.
- TLk is the new token list with all processes that sent their seqQ
- Msgsk is the union of the seqQ sets received
4. execute consensus among TLi processes, with initialk as the initial value
5. let (TL, Msg) be the consensus decision
6. stableQ ← Msg, seqQ ← {} /* as all processes get Msg, these messages are stable */
7. if pk ∈ TL, then ”install” TL as the next view TLi+1
else suicide
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5.2 i-Views on RBP
As Program-Controlled Crash has a non-negligible cost, we can also apply the technique
of “two views” [7] in order to minimize this cost. While regular views force the crash of
a process, i-views allow these suspected processes to keep alive. However, we cannot use
the suggestion of i-view proposed by Charron-Bost, i.e., move the suspected process to the
“end” of the membership list. As the token is periodically passed among the processes in
the view, just moving a suspect process does not solve the problem, and soon the token
passing is blocked again, requiring a new i-view change (that is also a costly operation).
In this work, we suggest a different approach to implement i-views, which is better
adapted to RBP. If we consider excluded processes as an “external set of processes”, we
can create i-views by considering the group {”core members”,”external”}. While all
broadcasts are sent to the whole group, the token is passed only among the “core” members,
which are not suspected. The concept of external receivers was already used by TRMP [15],
to allow hierarchical distribution of processes in a world wide network. As a suspected
process does not participate in the sequencing process (it is not in the token ring), it does
not block the token passing. As it still belongs to the view, it receives all broadcasts, and
can send messages to the group.
Because external processes do not receive the token, we cannot use the token passing to
ensure Reliable Broadcast and Total Order. In fact, as we don’t know precisely if an external
process is correct or not, no assumptions can be made about it. While Reliable Broadcast
and Total Order properties must be ensured for the “core” processes, the only thing we can
do for the external processes is to allow them to be kept up-to-date. This means that if an
external process missed a message, is its own responsibility to detect this event and request
message retransmissions, even if it remained unreachable for a long time (as illustrated in
Fig. 7).
Now, suppose this scenario: a network partition causes a correct process to be unreach-
able. As it is suspected, it will be removed from the token list, and moved to the external
list. The sequencing continues, messages become stable among the token list members, and
garbage collection is performed. If the partition is repaired, the excluded process is unable
to acquire lost messages, because they were already discarded. When this happens, it is
obligated to commit suicide (for example, if core member sends a “no more in the buffers”
message, as answer to the retransmission request).
Because garbage collection in RBP is executed simultaneously with message delivery, is
highly probable that a correct process excluded due to a network partition or to its relative
speed (too slow) will be forced to commit suicide. Through this fact, we observe that the
aggressive garbage collection from RBP cancels one of the most important advantages in
the use of i-views: avoid program-controlled crash on correct processes.
In order to minimize the program-controlled crash due to the absence of messages in the
buffers, we can consider that one or more processes keep messages while there is available
space, i.e., they postpone the garbage collection. This technique is completely feasible if we
consider today’s machines, and garbage collection can be executed when buffers are full or
when there is a regular view change (note that both possibilities force the crash of processes).
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Figure 7: I-view change and external members
5.3 Optimizing the i-View Change
By definition i-views aim to avoid blocking the protocol, not necessarily to solve the time-
bounded buffering problem. This means that the installation of an i-view does not require
garbage collection. If we consider the suggestions from the previous section, where garbage
collection is postponed the most possible, we can optimize the algorithm for i-view changes.
In fact, as i-views do not require garbage collection, message stabilization does not need
to be implemented by the i-view change. As message stabilization during a view change
is implemented by exchanging the set of sequenced messages from each process, we can
optimize the i-view algorithm by skipping this step, as presented in Algorithm 4:
Algorithm 4 Optimized i-view changes
Upon suspicion of some process in TLi
RBroadcast (i-view, i)
Upon R-Deliver (i-view, i) by pk for the first time
1. send ack to all
2. ∀pi, wait until receive ack from pi or pi suspected
3. let initialk contains TLk s.t.
- TLk is the new token list with all processes that sent ack
4. execute consensus among TLi processes, with initialk as the initial value
5. let TL be the consensus decision
6. if pk ∈ TL, then ”install” TL as the next view TLi+1
Using this optimized algorithm, processes are no more force to manipulate lists of mes-
sages each time there is an i-view change, what makes the i-views a “light-weight” version
of regular views. By reducing the overhead on the i-view changes, we reduce the impact of
wrong suspicions due to aggressive failure detectors. Similarly, i-views do not force a process
to suicide, reducing the overhead induced by the membership service.
5.4 When to use Regular Views
In the previous sections we focused exclusively on i-views. There, we have shown that, in
order to reduce the cost of program-controlled crash, some techniques can be applied to
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postpone the suicide of a correct process. However, there should be a time where regular
views are required.
According to the “two views” model, a regular view should be installed when a failure
detector with conservative timeouts suspects a process, while an i-view is installed each time
a suspect is raised by a failure detector with aggressive timeouts. Fortunately, this model
is very similar with the detection model presented in Section 4.1. Hence, as we have two
“levels” of failure detection, it is possible to start the view change that most adapts to the
situation: suspicions from the conservative failure detector generate regular view changes.
But regular view changes are not required only on the case of failures. For example,
there are events that can trigger the definition of a new view. The most obvious events
that require regular views are those who explicitly force the modification of the membership
group, i.e., the join and leave operations. As i-views consider only permutations on the set
of processes, when a member joins or leaves the group, no permutation on the i-view can
reflect these changes.
We can also define another event that triggers a regular view change. The same way as
the installation of a regular view forces processes to crash, we suggest that the suicide of a
process due to the incapacity to acquire missing messages should force a view change. In
fact, if a process knows that it should commit suicide, it can have a “fair” behavior and
execute leave before committing suicide. We consider this a “fair” behavior because if a
process execute leave before die, it informs the group that the replication level will decrease,
and the system can take some actions to compensate this. Otherwise, a new view will be
generated only when this process is suspected by a conservative failure detector.
5.5 Core-resiliency and Scalability
One important element on the performance analysis of a Total Order Broadcast algorithm is
its delivery latency. We consider delivery latency as the time elapsed between the broadcast
of a message m by the source process and the first time it is delivered to the application. On
RBP, latency depends on the resiliency level, because a message is only delivered after this
resiliency level is achieved. Indeed, if we consider a n-resiliency and the number of processes
grows up, the latency may reach undesirable levels. To prevent such effects, we may use
the own structure of the two-level membership to bound the delivery latency to acceptable
levels. Indeed, by defining a k-resiliency (where k is the number of processes in the core
group) and controlling the maximum number of process in the core group, it is possible to
limit the latency levels even if the system scales up.
This solution is somehow related to the architecture proposed by Maxemchuk for its
TRMP protocol [15], where nodes are hierarchically structured in order to reduce the number
of messages exchanged at global scale. Our proposal, however, does not require specialized
nodes as in the case of TRMP, but simply relies on the self-stabilization mechanism from the
two-level membership. Indeed, we assume that eventually only a subset of the processes will
be kept into the core group, keeping the delivery latency tied to a k -resiliency level where
k ≤ n. Further, due to the VSC properties, we can safely relax this mechanism by allowing
at most k′ < n of processes simultaneously in the core-group.
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Indeed, in a previous work [2] we observed that the delivery latency is closely related
to the number of processes in the token list, or by extension, in the core group. These
he experiments, conducted on the ID/HP i-cluster from the ID-IMAG laboratory1, eval-
uated the delivery latency of the RBP protocol with 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 machines (one
process/machine), comparing different core-resiliency levels. Hence, Fig. 8 presents the pro-
tocol performance when messages arrive according to a Poisson process of rate 10 messages
per second.
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Figure 8: Comparison between the performance of different core-resiliency levels
We observe that by fixing the number of elements in the core group, we can reduce the
delivery latency to a certain level (even if the overhead caused by the increasing network
traffic still represents an important factor). Therefore, a careful choice of a small core-group
allows the protocol to deliver messages with latency levels similar to conventional techniques
(we should not forget that the Atomic Broadcast based on the Consensus requires from 6
to 8 communication steps), while taking advantage of the reduced number of exchanged
messages that characterizes RBP.
6 Related Works
In the literature there are some examples of protocols that rely in the same principles of
RBP. Actually, most of them (RMP [16], TRMP [15]) are evolutions from RBP, and were
developed by the same research group.
RMP was the first successor of the RBP. The most evident change is the use of IP
multicast, what allows the protocol to reduce even more the cost of a communication step
(compared to an unicast send to all). Further, RMP includes some other features such as
the acknowledgement of multiple messages in a single ack and the selection of the resiliency
level. Most of these innovations were proposed with the specific objective to increase the
performance of the protocol. Nevertheless RMP has kept most of the structure from RBP,
such as the Three-Phase Commit (3PC) protocol in order to define the membership.
1http://www-id.imag.fr
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TRMP [15] is a time driven version of the RMP protocol, and was presented as an
Internet multicast protocol for the stock market. Due to the complexity of a world-wide
distributed stock market system, TRMP has to deal with other problems like scalability,
fairness and communication authentication, in addition to time constraints. To deal with
scalability, TRMP proposes the use of a hierarchy of rings, instead of one single ring, as used
by RBP and RMP. This avoids a long stabilization time, reduces the probability that the
system stops due to the failure of a remote process (in particular, a world-wide Reformation),
and allows the assignment of different levels of trustiness to the processes. These hierarchical
rings are organized such that processes of the higher ring are also members of a lower ring,
or at least, the lower ring receives retransmissions from the higher ring. In the same way,
secondary sources can participate by sending messages to primary sources, which will insert
them in the primary token ring. However, TRMP implements a centralized reformation
server, with redundant reformation servers are available in case of failures.
Otherwise, few works try to adapt Total Order Broadcast to large networks. Recently,
Guerraoui et al. [11] proposed FSR, an algorithm that intends to optimize the throughput of
a Total Order Broadcast algorithm. FSR is an hybrid approach based on the fixed-sequencer
strategy that do uses a token ring to ensure fairness among the nodes. Unfortunately,
FSR uses an one-level VSC membership, which forces the delivery latency to be linear
with the number of processes. We strongly believe that FSR can benefit from a two-levels
membership, as we did with RBP, to improve its latency and scalability.
7 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper we addressed the problem of Total Order Broadcast in the context of large-
scale distributed systems. Traditional algorithms are not fit for those environments as
they need to exchange too many messages to ensure a global delivery order. Hence, we
study RBP, a distributed agreement protocol that can operate in environments subjected
to message losses while still providing good performance rates and low network traffic. Due
to its communication performance levels, RBP is an interesting alternative for a distributed
application that should be deployed over a large area network such as a computational grid
or a P2P network.
RBP presents, however, some conceptual flaws. Indeed, it relies in a group membership
protocol that may induce inconsistencies, especially when dealing with large-scale systems.
Most of these problems are related to the original group membership defined by the protocol,
and therefore can be compensated by the use of up-to-date techniques. Hence, we worked on
a group membership service that not only ensures consistency properties but is optimized
to the operation in a wide-area network. For instance, we employed a new technique used
to minimize the problems generated by wrong failure suspicions, reducing the membership
overhead and minimizing the need for membership view changes. This technique is the
subject of recent publications and to the best of our knowledge has not yet been used in any
other implementation.
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While studying RBP, we also observe some potentialities for the creation of an optimistic
protocol: the way as it manages views and Total Order allows us to imagine possible solutions
that do not block the processing of messages when there is a failure. We believe that the
study of these situations can lead us to develop a family of protocols with high performance
and optimized view change.
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